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INTRODUCTION
Jessica Larson was barely two years old when her mother took the
law into her own hands and abducted her in defiance of a court order
that granted Jessica's father sole custody. When Jessica's father,
John Larson, next saw his little girl, she had already celebrated her
1159
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ninth birthday. During the seven long years that John Larson
searched for his daughter, he never knew whether she missed him or
even remembered him. John Larson was deprived of the opportu-
nity to witness countless milestones in Jessica's development; he was
left without memories of his daughter's metamorphosis from toddler
to young girl. In addition to John Larson's mental anguish and the
expense of carrying out a nationwide search, he also was deprived of
precious time with his daughter-time that can never be regained.
Regrettably, John Larson's ordeal is not uncommon. Despite an
increase in legislation in the early 1980s, a recent study confirms that
parental kidnapping remains a significant problem., Given the cur-
rent divorce rate, the incidence of parental kidnappings is expected
to remain high.2 Although the outlook is grim, parental kidnapping
is preventable with increased attention and flexible application of
legal remedies. 3
This Note begins by looking at the scope of the parental kidnap-
ping problem. Next, the effectiveness of current statutory and judi-
cial remedies in deterring parental kidnapping and securing the
return of abducted children is examined. This Note then reviews the
history and current application of tort remedies for custodial inter-
ference. Special attention is given to the recent Minnesota Supreme
Court decision in Larson v. Dunn4 and the decision's possible effect
on damage recovery for custodial interference in Minnesota. Finally,
this Note concludes with proposed legislation to supplement Minne-
sota's existing parental kidnapping laws and provide a comprehen-
sive means of damage recovery for victimized parents.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem
Parental kidnapping occurs when one parent abducts and conceals
a child without the consent of the other parent. 5 Parental kidnap-
ping can occur at any time. Some abductions occur before either
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PRE-
VENTION, MISSING, ABDUCTED AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN IN AMERICA 4 (May, 1990)
(Executive Summary) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEP'T STUDY].
2. Reynolds, Parental Kidnapping: A Proposed Act for Expanding Tort Remedies, 25
WASHBURN L.J. 242, 243 (1986).
3. JUSTICE DEP'T STUDY, supra note 1, at 19.
4. 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990).
5. Parental abduction is defined as the abduction of a child by a noncustodial
parent who (1) concealed the child's whereabouts from the custodial parent, (2) took
the child out of the state, or (3) apparently intended to keep the child. JUSTICE DEP'T
STUDY, supra note 1, at 9. For purposes of this Note, "parental kidnapping" and "pa-
rental abduction" are used interchangeably.
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parent is granted sole custody of the child,6 while others occur when
both parents share custody of the child.
The number of parental kidnapping cases is staggering. The first
comprehensive study of the number of missing children was released
by the United States Justice Department in May, 1990. The study
found that in 1988 an estimated 163,200 children had been abducted
by a parent.7 Children between the ages of two and eleven are most
frequently abducted.8 One child in ten is removed from the state by
the abducting parent,9 and at least twenty percent of stolen children
are never found.o
Whether the victimized parent has joint custody, sole custody, or
no custody or visitation rights, the injuries inflicted by the abducting
parent are severe." I The victimized parent is deprived of the oppor-
tunity to develop or maintain a close parental relationship with the
child. Similarly, the child is deprived of a relationship with the vic-
timized parent. 12
The financial and emotional damages suffered by victimized par-
ents are well documented. Spending $50,000 trying to locate and
regain custody of a child is not unusual.' 3 In addition, parents who
lose a child to a parental kidnapper often blame themselves for the
kidnapping.'4" As a result, depression can manifest itself in physical
6. The Justice Department found that 41% of parental abductions occurred
before the marital relationship ended. Id. at 8.
7. JUsTICE DEP'T STUDY, supra note 1, at 4. According to Missing Children Min-
nesota, in October, 1990, approximately 20 children in Minnesota were reported ab-
ducted by a parent. Prince, Agony of Abduction, Mpls. Star Tribune, Oct. 22, 1990, at
1 IA, col. 1 [hereinafter Agony of Abduction].
8. JUSTICE DEP'T SURVEY, supra note 1, at 6.
9. Id. at 8. The study found that most abductions are perpetrated by men who
are noncustodial fathers and father figures. Id. at 6.
10. When Parents Kidnap Their Own Children, 76 U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 30,
1981, at 66 [hereinafter Parents Kidnap].
11. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 244. TheJustice Department found that abducted
children experience serious or mild. mental harm in three of every ten cases. While
sexual abuse is one of the most feared aspects of family abduction, sexual abuse oc-
curs in less than one percent of cases, an unusually low figure. JUsTIcE DEP'T STUDY,
supra note 1, at 8.
12. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 244.
13. Deb Than, a Minneapolis mother, was reunited with her son after spending
twenty months and $50,000 to track him down. Agony of Abduction, supra note 7, at
1 A, col. 1. A Los Angeles court interpreter was reunited with her daughter after
spending five years and $20,000 in detective fees searching for her stolen daughter.
L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1990, at B4, col. 1. The child was five years old when she was
abducted. Id. The owner of a commercial cleaning business spent ten years and over
$200,000 to locate his daughter. Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1990, at BI, col. 1. His child
was abducted when she was just three years old. Id.
14. See Parents Kidnap, supra note 10, at 67.
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or emotional injury.,5
The physical and emotional injuries suffered by abducted children
are equally severe.' 6 Abducted children are frequently shocked or
frightened by the abduction itself; they miss the parent, relatives and
friends left behind; they are frequently moved from place to place
and are often forced to assume new identities.17 Most importantly,
the children are deprived of stability and the opportunity to develop
normal relationships. 18
B. Statutory Solutions
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)19 was the
first attempt to address the problem of parental kidnapping on a na-
tional level. The UCCJA was promulgated by the Commission on
Uniform Laws in 1968, and, by 1983, was adopted by all fifty states. 20
The UCCJA was created to prevent forum shopping by parents
hoping to obtain a more favorable custody decree in another state.2'
To accomplish this objective, the UCCJA set uniform guidelines to
identify one state as the exclusive forum for conducting child custody
proceedings.22 The "home state" has jurisdiction to handle all cus-
15. S. ABRAHMS, CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE: THE TRAGEDY OF PARENTAL KID-
NAPPING 166 (1983).
16. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 245. Children frequently exhibit post-traumatic
stress disorder, the effects of mental indoctrination, grief or rage about an absent
parent, and an exaggerated identification with or wish fulfillment about a parent. Id.
at 244-45.
17. Id. at 245.
18. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
19. 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988).
20. 1 J. MCCAHEY, M. KAUFMAN, C. KRAur & J. Zrr, CHILD CUSTODY & VIsrrA-
TION LAW AND PRACTICE 3A-1 (1991 & Supp. Mar. 1991); see Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 9-10 (Supp. 1990) (table of statutory citations for jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the UCCJA).
21. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9
U.L.A. 115, 118 (1988) [hereinafter Commissioners' Prefatory Note]. Before the UCCJA,
there was no certainty as to which state had jurisdiction when persons seeking cus-
tody of a child or modification or enforcement of an existing order approached the
courts of several states simultaneously or successively. Id. at 116. The judicial trend
permitted custody claimants to sue in any court, regardless of the child's fleeting
contact with the particular state. Therefore, divorced parents were encouraged to
seek a more favorable decree by moving the child to another state. Id. at 117. The
result was a great deal of uncertainty in the law and upheaval for children. Id. at 116.
Aside from minimal jurisdictional requirements, the easy modification of custody
decrees also contributed to the forum shopping problem. Since custody decrees do
not have a res judicata effect, the Supreme Court determined on several occasions
that custody decrees need not be given full faith and credit by other states. Ford v.
Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528 (1953). Therefore, states were free to completely disregard custody
decrees rendered in another forum.
22. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 21, at 117-18.
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tody matters related to the child.23
The UCCJA served as the model for the federal response to the
parental kidnapping problem, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act of 1980 (PKPA).24 The PKPA contains three main provisions.
First, the PKPA mandates full faith and credit for custody decrees
and visitation orders rendered by a state in conformity with articu-
lated federal standards. 25 Second, the PKPA authorizes the Federal
Parent Locator Service to aid in locating the child and the abducting
parent. 26 Third, the PKPA applies the Federal Fugitive Felon Act27
to parental kidnapping cases involving interstate or international
flight.28
Although the PKPA offers important assistance to the victimized
parent, it does not provide a criminal penalty. The victimized parent
must look to state law for criminal sanctions. Currently, forty-nine
jurisdictions impose criminal sanctions on a parent who takes a child
in violation of a custody order.29
23. Id.
24. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 18,
28 & 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1988).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1988). "Under the Fugitive Felon Act, the FBI can con-
duct nationwide investigations to locate persons wanted for 'felony' crimes who have
fled the state in which they committed the crime in order to avoid prosecution." P.
HOFF, LEGAL REMEDIES IN PARENTAL KIDNAPPING CASES: A COLLECTION OF MATERIALS
15-16 (5th ed. 1986) [hereinafter LEGAL REMEDIES]. If the FBI locates the fugitive, he
or she is arrested and extradited to face prosecution under state law. Id.
28. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 10, 94
Stat. 3566, 3573 (1980).
29. 2 J. MCCAHEY, M. KAUFMAN, C. KRAur & J. ZETr, CHILD CUSTODY & VISITA-
TION LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.08 (1991 & Supp. Mar. 1991) (includes citations for state
criminal statutes addressing custodial interference). The District of Columbia and
West Virginia are the only two jurisdictions that do not designate custodial interfer-
ence as a crime when committed by a parent. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2101 (1989);
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14 (1989).
Most state criminal laws treat custodial interference exclusively as a felony or
have enacted both felony and misdemeanor laws. The distinction is significant be-
cause prosecutors may invoke FBI assistance under the Fugitive Felon Act only when
the state classifies the crime as a felony and interstate flight is involved. LEGAL REME-
DIES, supra note 27, at app. F-1, F-2.
The current codification of Minnesota's parental kidnapping law makes it a fel-
ony for any person to conceal a child with the manifest intent to substantially deprive
another person of custody. MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990). By classifying parental kid-
napping as a felony, Minnesota allows application of the Fugitive Felon Act, 42
U.S.C. § 653 (1988). See also Comment, Parental Kidnapping in Minnesota, 13 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 985 (1987) (comprehensive discussion of Minnesota criminal sanc-
tions for parental kidnapping).
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C. Judicial Solutions
The judicial remedies of criminal contempt and habeas corpus are
often used in parental kidnapping cases if a court has determined
custody and issued a decree granting custody or visitation rights.30
Both remedies seek to enforce the existing decree and thus compel
prompt return of the child.31 Neither remedy offers a means to fi-
nancially compensate the victimized parent.32
A criminal contempt order may be obtained when a person ab-
ducts or conceals a child, or otherwise interferes with the enforce-
ment of an existing custody order or decree.33 However, there is no
assurance that a contempt citation will be enforced by a state differ-
ent from the forum jurisdiction. Consequently, the contempt rem-
edy is limited if a parent removes a child from the state of the issuing
court.3 4
The writ of habeas corpus is the principle remedy used for parents
claiming legal custody of an abducted child.35 In a child custody
habeas corpus proceeding, control of the child by the parent without
legal right to custody is deemed the equivalent of an unlawful reten-
tion.3 6 The writ is used to compel the parent accused of illegally
holding a child to appear before a court and justify the child's
retention.37
II. TORT REMEDIES FOR CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE
A. Early Tort Remedies
Child abduction has not always given rise to civil or criminal sanc-
tions.38 Early tort remedies for abduction or "enticement" of a child
30. S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING-THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF
CHILDREN 103, 108 (1981) [hereinafter CHILD SNATCHING].
31. See id.
32. See Comment, The Tort of Custodial Interference-Toward a More Complete Remedy
to Parental Kidnappings, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 240 (noting that most judicial reme-
dies such as civil contempt and ne exeat republica do not provide compensatory relief to
the victimized parent).
33. CHILD SNATCHING, supra note 30, at 102. Child snatching is considered a seri-
ous violation of a custody decree, and courts have broadly wielded their power in this
area. Id. at 102-03.
34. Id. at 103. See also Comment, supra note 32, at 240.
35. CHILD SNATCHING, supra note 30, at 108.
36. Id. at 112.
37. Id. When the abducting parent can be located, the UCCJA removes most
jurisdictional bars to the enforcement or modification of the original custody decree.
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
38. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 924 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. Early com-
mon law only provided a remedy for the abduction of an heir. This action apparently
was based upon the parent's pecuniary loss of the heir's marriage prospects, and
1164 [Vol. 17
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evolved from English common law of master and servant. Courts
used these remedies to compensate the parent for the loss of the
legal right to the value of the child's services.3 9 Therefore, actual
pecuniary loss from the child's unavailability to render services was a
necessary element to a victimized parent's suit for custodial
interference.40
The lost services requirement in child abduction cases was never
uniformly adopted in the United States.4' So long as a victimized
parent could establish the legal right to a child's services, many
courts were willing to find "constructive" loss of services. 42 Other
courts recognized that the real basis for a tort remedy was the inter-
ference with the parent-child relationship and did not even consider
the issue of constructive loss of services.4S
As tort law evolved, intangible aspects of family relationships, such
therefore did not apply to the other children. Id. Under English common law, the
father had no property interest in children other than his heir.
This was "by reason the marriage of his heir belongs to the father, but not
any other his sons or daughters; and although ... the writ of trespass lay for
a parrot, a popinjay, a thrush, and . . . for a dog; the reason thereof is,
because the law imputes that the owner hath a property in them."
Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 476, 169 N.E. 650, 651 (1930) (quoting Barnham v.
Dennis, 2 Cro. Eliz. 770).
39. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 38, at 915-16. Since only the father had a
legal right to the child's services, the mother could not maintain suit unless the child
was illegitimate or the father had died or abandoned the child. Id. at 924.
40. Id. at 916. Suit could not be maintained unless the child was able to render
services and the loss of the child's services resulted in financial injury to the parent.
Id. The mere relationship of the parties was insufficient to constitute loss of service.
Therefore, if the injured child was too immature or incapable of providing services,
the parent might be left without a remedy against the tortfeasor. Pickle, 252 N.Y. at
476-77, 169 N.E. at 651. The harsh results of this rule made it subject to frequent
criticism. Id. at 477, 169 N.E. at 651.
41. Pickle, 252 N.Y. at 479, 169 N.E. at 652 ("[W]e find no decisions by the courts
of this country holding that, in actions to recover damages for the abduction of a
child, the parent must allege and prove, as a condition of his recovery, a loss of serv-
ices of the child."). Although an early New Jersey case purported to adopt the Eng-
lish rule requiring proof of lost services, the court held that despite the young age of
the children, the jury could infer a loss of services. McGee v. Holland, 27 NJ.L. 86,
96 (1858).
42. See, e.g., Washburn v. Abram, 122 Ky. 53, 56-57, 90 S.W. 997, 998 (1906);
McGee, 27 NJ.L. at 96-97; Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 311-12 (1877).
43. See, e.g., Soper v. Igo, Walker & Co., 121 Ky. 550, 552, 89 S.W. 538, 539
(1905) (In an action for the abduction of a child, it is immaterial whether the ab-
ducted child rendered services to his parents.); Pickle, 252 N.Y. at 482, 169 N.E. at
653 ("It would be a reproach to our legal system if, for the abduction of a child in
arms, no remedy ran to its parent, although 'for a parrot, a popinjay, a thrush,' and
even 'for a dog' an ample remedy is furnished to their custodian for the loss of their
possession."); Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 287, 78 S.E. 222, 224 (1913) (The
theory that such action was grounded on a loss of service was an "outworn fiction.").
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as companionship and affection, were afforded wider protection.44
This "modem view" of tort recovery for child abduction does not
require proof of lost services.45 When a child is taken from its par-
ent, the existence of other damages are a sufficient basis for the
cause of action.46
B. Intentional Interference with Custodial Rights
In 1938, the Restatement of Torts recognized a cause of action for
interruption of the parent-child relationship.47 The tort requires (1)
44. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 38, at 916. Courts do not give intangible
interests the same degree of protection in every case. Direct interference with the
relationship is treated with greater severity than indirect interference (e.g., through
physical injury to a family member). Id. In addition, courts have afforded the parent-
child relationship somewhat less protection than the husband-wife relationship. Id.
45. Id. at 924-25. The modem custodial interference tort is analogized to the
"consortium" found in the relationship of husband and wife. Id. at 924. Consortium
consists of the bundle of legal rights that includes the services, society, and sexual
intercourse of a spouse. Id. at 916. At common law, when a person affirmatively
interfered with the marriage relationship, the aggrieved spouse could recover in tort
through common law actions of enticement or abduction, criminal conversation
(adultery), and alienation of affections. Id. at 917-18.
Although a parent could recover for mental anguish and loss of services or soci-
ety against a party who interfered with the custody of a child, recovery was not per-
mitted solely for alienation of the child's affections. Id. at 928; see, e.g., Pyle v.
Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 697-98, 210 N.W. 926, 928-29 (1926); but see Strode v.
Gleason, 9 Wash. App. 13, 20, 510 P.2d 250, 254 (1973) (permitting the parent to
recover for alienation of a child's affections).
Given the focus on losses relating to the marital relationship, early cases did not
recognize a child's right to recover damages for intangible losses occurring as a result
of an injury to the parent. Beginning in 1980, however, a few states recognized a
cause of action brought by the child for loss of parental consortium when an injury
seriously disrupted the parent-child relationship. See Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259,
270 (Iowa 1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connor's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 516, 413
N.E.2d 690, 696 (1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 11, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427
(1981). Similarly, few cases permit the child to recover for alienation of the parent's
affections. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 38, at 929. Only two states permitted a
child to recover for alienation of a parent's affections. See Johnson v. Luhman, 330
Ill. App. 598, 607, 71 N.E.2d 810, 814 (1947); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 405,
37 N.W.2d 543, 546-47 (1949).
Actions for interference with domestic relations that carry an accusation of sex-
ual misbehavior (i.e., criminal conversation, seduction, and to some extent, aliena-
tion of affections) were susceptible to abuse through blackmail and extortion. As a
result, the majority of states abolished these "heart balm" torts or narrowed them to
insignificance. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 38, at 929-30; see, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§§ 553.01-.03 (1990) (abolishing civil causes of action for breach of promise to
marry, alienation of affections, criminal conversation and seduction).
46. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 38, at 924-25. "Other damages" include
damages for deprivation of the child's society, expenses for recovering the child and
injury to the parent's feelings. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700 (1932). The tort of "inducing a minor child to
leave or not to return home" was originally defined as follows:
1166 [Vol. 17
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss4/6
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE
an intentional interference with (2) the custodial parent's legal right
to custody of the child.48 Proof of loss of the child's services is not
required.49
If a victimized parent establishes intentional interference with a su-
perior right to custody of the child, that parent may recover damages
for the emotional distress resulting from the child's abduction. The
parent may also recover for the loss of the child's society or services,
reasonable expenses incurred to regain custody of the child, and
treatment for the child of any illness or other bodily harm resulting
from the defendant's tortious conduct. 50 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts recognizes a privilege allowing interference with a parent-child
relationship when it appears "reasonably probable that the child is
about to suffer immediate harm or that it will be subjected to imme-
diate harm if it returns to its home." 5 '
Currently, twenty-one states allow a victimized parent to recover
in tort for custodial interference. 52 Eight states have enacted stat-
One who, without a privilege to do so,
(a) abducts a minor child, or
(b) induces it to leave home with knowledge that the parent has
not consented, or
(c) with knowledge that it has left its home and that the parent is
unwilling that the child should be absent, induces it not to return
thereto or prevents it from so doing,
is liable to the parent, who is legally entitled to the child's custody.
Id.
48. The current version of section 700 is as follows: "One who, with knowledge
that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor
child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent
after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977).
49. Id. § 700 comment d.
50. See id. § 700 comment g.
51. Id. § 700 comment e.
52. Very few states that have considered the issue declined to allow tort recovery
for custodial interference. See McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F. Supp. 680, 684-85 (N.D.
Fla. 1984) (interpreting Florida law; primary issue was federal court jurisdiction of
domestic dispute), aff'd, 786 F.2d 1465 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Schuppin v. Unification
Church, 435 F. Supp. 603, 609 (D. Vt.) (interpreting Vermont law; court found no
cause of action for alienation of adult child's affections), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir.
1977); Bartanus v. Lis, 332 Pa. Super. 48, 57, 480 A.2d 1178, 1182 (1984) (constru-
ing custodial interference as an action to recover for alienation of the child's affec-
tion).
In Illinois, the courts are split regarding whether to recognize a tort remedy for
custodial interference. Compare Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, 469 N.E.2d
659 (1984) (recognizing a cause of action for custodial interference) with Whitehorse
v. Critchfield, 144 I11. App. 3d 192, 494 N.E.2d 743 (1986) (declining to recognize
the tort of custodial interference without legislative directive).
Other states have not expressly recognized the custodial interfeience tort but
quote extensive authority supporting the cause of action when addressing other is-
sues. See, e.g., Finn v. Lipman, 526 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1987); Hixon v. Buchberger, 306
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utes permitting tort recovery for child abduction,5S and the remain-
der allow recovery under common law.54 States that provide
recourse for the victimized parent through common law adopt differ-
Md. 72, 507 A.2d 607 (1986); In re Marriage of Hall, 25 Wash. App. 530, 607 P.2d
898 (1980).
53. These eight state statutes range from sparse statements granting a cause of
action to specific statutory schemes. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 49(a) (1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-515(2) (1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.50 (Supp. 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8(2) (1987); R.I. GEN. Laws § 9-1-43(a) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-21-45 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-7(2) (1987); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 36.01-.08 (1985).
54. See, e.g., D & D Fuller CATV Constr., Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520, 526 (Colo.
1989) (Mother brought suit against paternal grandparents; court held that tortious
interference with the parent-child relationship occurred in Colorado for purposes of
long-arm statute.); Shields v. Martin, 109 Idaho 132, 138, 706 P.2d 21, 27 (1985)
(Mother and police officer were jointly liable for the abduction of the child from a
daycare center.); Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 663, 161 N.E. 251, 253 (1928)
(Mother brought suit for custodial interference against former husband, his parents,
brother and sister after both a habeas corpus filing and the husband's extradition and
conviction on parental kidnapping charges failed to secure the child's return.); Wood
v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 124-25 (Iowa 1983) (Claim for damages asserted against
parent who refused to return child within the time provided in the dissolution de-
cree.); Brown v. Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 498, 61 N.W.2d 656, 659 (1953) (Mother
recovered damages against former in-laws who aided her former husband in abduct-
ing her children to South Africa.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954); Plante v. Engel,
124 N.H. 213, 217, 469 A.2d 1299, 1302 (1983) (Court recognized cause of action
for custodial interference when father alleged that maternal grandparents had con-
spired to interfere with his rights to custody.); Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 287,
78 S.E. 222, 224 (1913) (Father had cause of action for custodial interference against
the child's maternal grandfather.); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 312 (1877)
(Grandfather given sole custody of his two grandchildren by their parents entitled to
seek recovery in loco parentis for custodial interference against the parents.); McBride
v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 435, 578 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1978) (Mother alleged suffi-
cient facts to establish the right to recover in tort against a police officer for interfer-
ence with her right to custody.); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hospital, 89 R.I. 195, 198,
151 A.2d 690, 692 (1959) (Plaintiff could recover nominal damages against hospital
for its willful invasion of her legally-protected right to custody of her child.); Silcott v.
Ogelsby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. 1986) (Grandfather liable to child's stepfather
under the common law tort of child abduction.).
See also Armstrong v. McDonald, 39 Ala. App. 485, 486, 103 So. 2d 818, 819
(1958) (Plaintiff recovered damages for custodial interference when her son was per-
suaded to leave home and work as a migrant farm worker.); Surina v. Lucey, 168 Cal.
App. 3d 539, 543, 214 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1985) (Maternal uncle could be liable to
parents for damages resulting from his abduction of their child.); Mathews v. Murray,
101 Ga. App. 216, 219, 113 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1960) (Father could recover against
third party who conspired with child's mother to remove child from the jurisdiction.);
Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200, 202 (La. Ct. App.) (Mother had legal duty to
custodial father under state parental kidnapping statute; breach of duty was an ac-
tionable tort.), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 960 (La. 1979); Kipper v. Vokolek, 546 S.W.2d
521, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (Father unable to recover for custodial interference
against ex-wife and her new husband because he was unable to establish a superior
right to custody.); LaGrenade v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 329, 330, 264 S.E.2d 757,
757-58 (Mother sued child's father and paternal grandparents for interference with
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ent approaches. Many state supreme courts apply section 700 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.55 Other states recognize the parent's
legal interest in the custody of the child and base recovery on the
sanctity of the parent-child relationship.56
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) was
developed to compensate plaintiffs for emotional injuries sustained
as a direct result of the intentional conduct of another.57 The basic
principle is embodied in section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of
her right to custody arising from contract.), appeal dismissed, 300 N.C. 557, 270 S.E.2d
109 (1980), appeal after remand, 60 N.C. App. 650, 299 S.E.2d 809 (1983).
In various federal court decisions, the court interpreted how the state supreme
court would likely rule on the issue of the tort's adoption. See, e.g., DiRuggerio v.
Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1018 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying New Jersey law; court held
that New Jersey recognizes a cause of action for custodial interference and allowed
father to proceed with suit against ex-wife, her current husband and their children,
and her attorney.); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir.) (applying
Maryland law; wife permitted to bring custodial interference suit against her former
husband, his new wife, the child's paternal grandparents, and the attorneys who rep-
resented her former husband in the custody proceeding), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014
(1982); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Texas law;
judgment for custodial interference upheld and mother permitted to recover dam-
ages from ex-husband and his relatives); Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D.
I1. 1987) (applying Illinois law; court declined to follow Whitehorse v. Critchfield,
144 Ill. App. 3d 192, 494 N.E.2d 743 (1986), and recognized a father's claims for
custodial interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress against his
child's maternal grandparents); Bennett v. Bennett, 595 F. Supp. 366, 368 (D.D.C.
1984) (When mother violated father's custody rights under a decree, she had to com-
pensate him for any harm done.); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (E.D.
Wis.) (applying Wisconsin law; Wisconsin recognizes the tort of custodial interfer-
ence and permitted father to recover against his former wife, her new husband and
the child's maternal grandparents), aff'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Kajtazi v.
Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 21-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying New York law; mother
recovered substantial damages against former husband, his stepfather and brother
when they conspired to abduct the child and remove him to Yugoslavia).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977); see, e.g., Wood, 338 N.W.2d at
124; Brown, 338 Mich. at 498, 61 N.W.2d at 659. Several federal courts also have
relied on section 700 to predict how a state would formulate a tort remedy for custo-
dial interference. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 1982).
56. See Plante, 124 N.H. at 216-17, 469 A.2d at 1301-02; Bedard, 89 R.I. at 198,
151 A.2d at 692. The Louisiana Supreme Court took a somewhat different approach
and implied a tort action based on the state's criminal statute for parental kidnap-
ping. See Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200, 202 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 376 So.
2d 960 (La. 1979).
57. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 38, at 60-61. Early IED cases refused all
remedy for mental injury, unless the action was brought within the scope of an al-
ready recognized tort. Id. at 57. Gradually, too many cases appeared in which no
recognized tort was found. By the 1930s, extreme and outrageous conduct causing
emotional distress constituted a cause of action in itself. See id. at 60.
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Torts.58 Four elements are necessary to state a cause of action for
IIED: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct59 (2) done intentionally
or with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional
distress6o (3) resulting in severe emotional distress61 (4) actually or
proximately caused by the outrageous conduct.
Because of the difficulty in establishing the boundaries of outra-
geous conduct,62 the IIED tort is not as widely applied to parental
kidnapping cases as is the tort of custodial interference. In Kajtazi v.
Kajtazi,63 however, the court found the abducting father's conduct
sufficiently outrageous to award the mother substantial damages for
lost society and "wounded feelings" under the tort of intentional in-
terference with custodial rights and damages for emotional distress
under lIED. Her former husband had abducted the child and re-
moved him to Yugoslavia. The court stated: "It is difficult to con-
ceive of intentional conduct more calculated to cause severe
emotional distress than the outrageous conduct of [the abducting fa-
58. Section 46 reads as follows:
Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck-
lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from
it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is sub-
ject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at
the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress re-
sults in bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
59. Outrageous conduct is described as follows:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civi-
lized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the
facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
Id. § 46 comment d.
60. The element of intentional or reckless disregard is satisfied when the defend-
ant "[d]esires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he knows that such
distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct." Id. § 46 com-
ment i. This element is also satisfied when the defendant acts recklessly, "in deliber-
ate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow."
Id.
61. "The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no rea-
sonable man could be expected to endure it." Id. § 46 commentj. "Severe distress
must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the de-
fendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed." Id.
62. Comment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Recovery of Damages for Vic-
tims of Parental Kidnapping, 1984 S. ILL. LJ. 145, 157.
63. 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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ther] in surreptitiously abducting the infant, from his mother who
had legal custody .... This outrageous conduct constitutes the dis-
tinct tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering. ... "64
In Sheltra v. Smith,65 the court held that a mother had established a
prima facie case of IIED when the defendant rendered it impossible
for her to have personal contact with her daughter for one month.66
However, other courts indicate a reluctance to apply the IIED tort
against family members.67
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress differs from
the tort of intentional interference with custodial rights in two ways.
First, a parent's allegation of IIED does not depend upon that par-
ent's legal right to custody of the child. Second, recovery under
IIED is limited to compensation for the plaintiff's emotional
distress.68
D. Recovery Against Third Parties
Tort actions against third parties involved in the abduction or con-
cealment of the child can be persuasive tools to obtain information
when the child or abducting parent cannot be found.69 Individuals
who assist in the child's abduction may be joined as civil conspirators
to the tort of intentional interference with custodial rights.70 Per-
64. Id. at 20-21.
65. 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978).
66. Id. at 475, 392 A.2d at 433. The Sheltra court evaluated the case under IIED
and did not consider the application of the custodial interference tort. See id. at 476,
393 A.2d at 433.
67. See, e.g., Bartanus v. Lis, 332 Pa. Super. 48, 480 A.2d 1178 (1984). In
Bartanus, a father brought an action for enticement and alienation of his son's affec-
tions. The court held that the facts pled could support a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress against the parent's sister and brother-in-law. The court
noted the potential for abuse of the IIED tort when one parent sues the other. Id. at
54-55, 480 A.2d at 1181.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977). In comparison, section
700 provides a much more comprehensive damage recovery for the victimized par-
ent. For the text of section 700, see supra note 50.
69. LEGAL REMEDIES, supra note 27, at 69. The victimized parent frequently re-
quires financial resources to search for or put pressure on the abductor to return the
child. Money can be raised and information can be received through judgments
against friends, relatives, or others who aided the abductor.
70. Civil conspirators are held jointly and severally liable when means are em-
ployed or purposes are accomplished that are themselves tortious and the conspira-
tors have "merely planned, assisted or encouraged the active wrongdoer." PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 38, at 324. Mere agreement is not enough. There must be
an act by one of the parties in pursuance of the agreement which is itself a tort. Id.
See, e.g., DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1010 (3d Cir. 1984) (alleged conspir-
ators included the abducting mother, her new husband and their children, as well as
three state court judges); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 833 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982) (alleged conspirators included the abducting hus-
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sons have been held liable as conspirators for providing financial
support and aiding in the concealment of the child,71 for arranging
for passports, 72 and for misrepresenting the location of the child or
abductor.73
III. LARSON V. DUNN
A. The Facts
John Larson and Loree Rigenhagen were married in February
1978 and their daughter, Jessica, was born soon thereafter. 74 In
February 1980, Loree Rigenhagen commenced an action to dissolve
the marriage and was granted temporary physical custody of Jes-
sica.7 5 Under the final dissolution decree, John Larson was awarded
sole custody ofJessica. 76 On the evening of November 5, 1980, John
Larson went to the home of Loree Rigenhagen's parents to claim his
daughter but was denied access to Jessica by Loree Rigenhagen's fa-
ther. The following day, John Larson again, armed with a copy of
the court order granting him custody, attempted to claim Jessica, but
was told that Loree Rigenhagen had fled the state with Jessica.77 A
warrant was issued for Loree Rigenhagen's arrest for felony depriva-
tion of parental rights.78 These events marked the commencement
of John Larson's seven-year, nationwide search for his daughter. 79
In August 1987, Loree Rigenhagen andJessica were located by the
FBI in the state of Washington.80 Loree Rigenhagen was subse-
quently charged with and pled guilty to violating the Minnesota
criminal statute for parental kidnapping.81 Jessica was returned to
band's new wife, the paternal grandparents, and the attorneys who represented the
abducting father in the original custody proceeding).
71. Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1109-11 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Texas
law).
72. Brown v. Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 499, 61 N.W.2d 656, 659 (1953), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 816 (1954).
73. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying New
York law).
74. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1990).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Loree Rigenhagen later claimed that she left when the temporary custody
order was still valid and she did not learn until 30 days later that John Larson had
been granted permanent physical custody ofJessica. Loree Rigenhagen also alleged
John Larson had physically abused her and sexually abused Jessica. Id. at 42.
78. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990).
79. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 41. John Larson's search for Jessica included efforts
by local law enforcement authorities as well as the FBI. During his seven-year search
for Jessica, John Larson spent more than $50,000. Id.
80. Id. at 42.
81. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1990).
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John Larson's custody.8 2
To recover for emotional distress and the financial expenses re-
sulting from the abduction, John Larson filed a civil lawsuit against
Loree Rigenhagen, her parents, her aunt, her uncle and her brother
for their conduct in the abduction and concealment of Jessica.83
John Larson sought damages both individually and on Jessica's be-
half.84 The complaint alleged intentional interference with custodial
rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy
and fraud. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.8 5
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized a cause of
action for custodial interference.86 The court of appeals held that
Minnesota public policy supported recognition of the new cause of
action in tort, and that John Larson was entitled to an opportunity to
establish a claim for damages. 87
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to consider
whether the new tort of intentional interference with custodial rights
should be recognized.88 Acknowledging that its decision was not
consistent with the nationwide trend,89 the supreme court reversed
82. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 42.
83. Id. John Larson's claims against Loree Rigenhagen's parents and other rela-
tives were based on information he obtained from Jessica after her return. John Lar-
son learned from Jessica that her grandparents and uncle visited Loree Rigenhagen
and Jessica during their seven-year absence. John Larson alleged that those same
persons denied having any knowledge of Loree Rigenhagen's whereabouts when
they were questioned by various authorities. Id.
84. Id. John Larson sought damages for his mental anguish and suffering, loss of
society and companionship of his daughter, and out-of-pocket expenses for locating
her and recovering her custody. Damages were claimed on Jessica's behalf for loss of
her father's companionship during the abduction. Id.
85. Id. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 12.03 (1990).
86. Larson v. Dunn, 449 N.W.2d 751, 758 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd in part, 460
N.W.2d 39 (1990).
87. Id. In a well-reasoned opinion, the court of appeals summarized the federal
and state criminal penalties for parental kidnapping. Id. at 754. The court recog-
nized that, although a civil remedy is not precluded, neither federal nor state criminal
laws authorized a cause of action for damages sustained by the victimized parent. Id.
at 755. The panel noted the nationwide trend toward recognition of the tort and its
recognition by the Restatement of Torts. Id. The court turned to section 700 of the
Restatement of Torts to define the parameters of the cause of action. Id. at 756. Finally,
the panel broke down the damages recoverable under the Restatement and justified the
recovery of each under the guidelines set by existing Minnesota law. Id. at 756-58.
88. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990).
89. Id. at 44. "The trend in the past years has been toward recognizing this tort.
Approximately one third of the state appellate courts have ruled on this issue." Id.
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the court of appeals and refused to recognize the new tort.9 0 A
forceful dissent argued that principles of equity and fairness com-
pelled following the nationwide trend to permit victimized parents to
recover damages under a custodial interference cause of action. 9 1
The court stated that, in disputes over children, the welfare and
best interests of the child are more important than the rights of the
parents. 9 2 The court reasoned that recognition of the tort could cre-
ate an additional burden on an abducted child and require relitiga-
tion of the original custody decision.93 The court characterized the
tort of custodial interference as a potentially divisive force which
could pit child against parent or other family members in a bitter
court battle.9
4
Fundamental to the court's decision is its argument that sufficient
redress already exists under Minnesota law for the victimized parent
of a kidnapped child. The court explained that, when kidnapping
involves defiance of a court order, the appropriate remedy lies with
contempt and other judicial sanctions. 9 5 In addition, the court noted
that financial redress for victimized parents is available under Minne-
sota's victim's rights and parental kidnapping statutes.
96
The court reasoned that two existing torts offer relief to victimized
parents in Minnesota. First, a parent may seek relief in "egregious"
cases by alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress.97 Sec-
ond, damages may be awarded for the child's lost services. 98 The
court concluded that a new tort remedy was unnecessary because it
would offer no deterrent to future kidnappings and could result in a
flood of family-related litigation.99
The three dissenting justices appeared to be moved by the harsh
facts ofJohn Larson's seven-year ordeal. The dissent argued that the
law should protect against intentional interference with custodial
rights and discourage non-custodial parents from resorting to self-
For an extensive survey of jurisdictions ruling on the issue, see id. at 44 n.3. See also
supra notes 52-54.
90. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 44, 45, 47. The majority consisted of Justices Keith,
Wahl, Simonett and Coyne.
91. Id. at 47 (Popovich, J., dissenting). Justices Kelley and Yetka joined in the
dissent. Id. at 53.
92. Id. at 45.
93. Id. at 46.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 47.
96. Id. For a discussion of the damages recoverable under Minnesota's victim's
rights and parental kidnapping statutes, see infra text accompanying notes 122-28.
97. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 47 ("Expanding the adversarial process to include this new tort is con-
trary to the best interests of children and will only intensify intrafamily conflict grow-
ing out of marriage dissolution without deterring parental abduction.").
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help measures.' 00 The dissent concluded that deprivation of John
Larson's right to custody in clear violation of a court decree and de-
nial ofJessica's right to a relationship with her father deserved some
form of tort redress.' 0 '
In reaching the conclusion that John Larson should be permitted
to recover damages, the dissent considered the public policy implica-
tions of a new tort for custodial interference. Tort law has long been
used to protect relational interests.' 02 In addition, the dissent noted
numerous gaps in remedies currently available to the victims of pa-
rental kidnapping in Minnesota.' 0 3 The dissent argued that the ap-
proach espoused by section 700 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
could effectively fill those gaps and help to make the victimized par-
ent whole. 104
The dissent suggested that the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress be used as an alternative means of recovery for a vic-
timized parent.105 The justices recognized that the Larson facts may
fit this recognized cause of action, and suggested that John Larson
be permitted to recover damages for emotional distress under either
the tort of intentional interference with custodial rights or the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.10 6
Although the dissent agreed with the majority that the legal system
is a poor place to settle family disputes,107 the justices recognized
that family relationships have been wounded by the divorce and kid-
napping, long before a law suit is filed. Depriving the victimized par-
ent of redress will not necessarily promote healing.108 The dissent
concluded that a tort remedy for custodial interference was appro-
priate, despite persisting family discord, because the tort could com-
pensate the aggrieved parent, encourage the return of the child, and
promote respect for custody decrees.' 0 9
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LARSON DECISION
In Larson, both the majority and the dissent wrestled with the pol-
icy implications of a tort remedy for custodial interference. The
court considered the effects of a tort remedy on the abducted child
100. Id. at 48.
101. Id. at 52.
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id. at 51. The dissent distinguished the custodial interference cause of action
from the disfavored remedy of alienation of affections. Id.
104. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 49-50.
105. Id. at 52.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 48.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 52.
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and the need for tort relief given the legal remedies currently avail-
able to victimized parents in Minnesota. The court ultimately failed,
however, to adequately address either concern.
A victimized parent in Minnesota continues to bear the emotional
and financial burdens that result from the abduction of a child. The
court's refusal to recognize John Larson's claim under any tort the-
ory violates basic notions of fairness and provides no substantial con-
tribution to the child's welfare.
A. Advantages of a Tort Remedy for Custodial Interference in Promoting
the Child's Welfare
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a new means
of intrafamily litigation was in the best interests of abducted chil-
dren. The original custody award is made considering the best inter-
ests of the child.Ito However, once custody is determined, the
child's best interests are generally best served by providing stability
in the custodial arrangements."' Custodial stability is most effec-
tively achieved by respecting, and if necessary, by enforcing the orig-
inal custody decision.
Parental kidnapping laws further the dual objectives of deterring
abductions and providing for swift return of the child to the parent
with lawful custody.1 12 However, no single remedy has proved suffi-
cient to accomplish both of these objectives. Therefore, flexibility in
the application and development of legal remedies is crucial.
110. See, e.g., Curtiss v. Hagen, 280 Minn. 296, 159 N.W.2d 193 (1968). At com-
mon law, the father was recognized as the legal custodian of the child. Early custody
cases thus usually awarded custody to the father. Eventually, the rule evolved into a
presumption that when the child was under the ages of twelve to fourteen, the
mother's custody was preferable. This was called the "tender years" doctrine. COM-
MITrEE ON THE FAMILY OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY: NEW
TRENDS IN CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 22, 29-30 (1980) [hereinafter NEW
TRENDS].
Modern custody determinations are sex-neutral and are made on a case-by-case
basis. In awarding custody, the court attempts to determine which arrangement
would be in the "best interests of the child." Id. at 35-38. The criteria used to deter-
mine the child's best interests frequently include: the wishes of the parents; the
wishes of the child; the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents,
siblings and others; the child's adjustment to his home, school and community; and
the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. Id. at 38 (citations
omitted).
111. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 31-34 (1979). Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's recommendations rely heavily on
psychoanalytic theory and the clinical experiences of two of the authors. They argue
that stability after the determination of custody is crucial to the psychological well-
being of the child. Id. See also NEW TRENDS, supra note 110, at 42, 46 (noting that
courts recognize that psychiatric principles are highly relevant in determining what
arrangements are in the child's best interests).
112. See Comment, supra note 32, at 235-36.
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Although state criminal penalties address the problem of parental
kidnapping, they do not serve as a complete deterrent to parents
who believe they act in the child's best interests. While the threat of
tort damages may not deter these parents, the possibility of civil liti-
gation may convince third parties not to provide needed assistance
with the abduction." 3 Additionally, the threat of civil liability may
avert a prolonged period of abduction by discouraging family and
friends from concealing information essential to locating the child.
While criminal and judicial sanctions are typically the first reme-
dies used by an aggrieved parent to secure a child's return,"l 4 the
sanctions' effectiveness is limited in situations similar to Larson,
where the abducting parent has fled the court's jurisdiction. 1 5 A
tort action for custodial interference would supplement the existing
criminal and judicial sanctions. A judgment for money damages
could put a parent in a more advantageous position from which to
finance a search or negotiate for the return of a child.' 16
B. Policy Implications of Permitting Tort Recovery for Custodial
Interference Against Family Members
Both the Larson majority and dissent acknowledge that any benefits
flowing from a tort remedy for custodial interference may be out-
weighed by negative policy implications. Of particular concern is the
potential effect a custodial interference tort remedy may have on
family relationships.' 17
113. LEGAL REMEDIES, supra note 27, at 73; CHILD SNATCHING, supra note 30, at 98.
114. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 263.
115. Fortunately, victimized parents in Minnesota can draw on the resources of
the Parent Locator Service and the services of the FBI made available through the
PKPA. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
Although the authorization of FBI involvement under the PKPA suggests the
availability of great assistance, the FBI often is reluctant to act. Note, Tortious Interfer-
ence With Custody: An Action to Supplement Iowa Statutory Deterrents to Child Snatching, 68
IOWA L. REV. 495, 505 (1983). Historically, the FBI has been hesitant to become
involved in "family dispute[s]" and divert its limited resources away from "violent
criminals, organized crime, white collar crime, and public corruption." Id. at 505-06
(citing Justice Dep't Scored for Flouting Parental Kidnapping Act's Mandate, 7 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2739, 2741 (Oct. 6, 1981)).
116. LEGAL REMEDIES, supra note 27, at 69. See also notes 69-73 and accompanying
text.
117. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 45-46 (Minn. 1990) ("For the good of our
children, the law should seek to promote such harmony as is possible in families
fractured by the dissolution process. At a minimum, the law should not provide a
means of escalating intrafamily warfare.").
The Larson majority compared the custodial interference tort to the disfavored
remedy of alienation of affections. The majority reasoned that the same policy rea-
sons which resulted in abolition of the "heart balm" torts in Minnesota barred recog-
nition of a custodial interference tort. See id. at 46 (quoting Bock v. Lindquist, 278
N.W.2d 326, 327-28 (Minn. 1979), in which the court refused to recognize a parent's
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The court's concern that the law promote domestic harmony re-
flects a longstanding ambivalence regarding the proper role of the
courts in intrafamily litigation1 l8 Despite this concern, litigation be-
tween family members is permitted.1 9 Preventing an aggrieved par-
ent from recovering damages will not make the abduction any less
acrimonious or painful for the child or for other family members. In
fact, leaving one parent to bear the financial and emotional burdens
resulting from the abducting parent's wrongful conduct may exacer-
bate an already volatile situation.
The Larson majority voiced concern over the effect that a custodial
interference tort suit would have on the child. The burden on the
child would likely be minimal. The cause of action requires only that
the plaintiff-parent establish a custodial right to the child and that
the defendant violated that right. 120 The child's testimony or partici-
pation in a civil lawsuit to establish custodial interference is no more
necessary than in a criminal prosecution against the parent or co-
conspirators.
C. Adequacy of Existing Remedies
The Larson majority reasoned that tort recovery in a parental kid-
napping situation is unnecessary because existing laws provide ade-
quate relief for victimized parents. This decision brings the
inadequacy of current remedies under Minnesota law into sharp
focus.
1. Damage Recovery Under State Criminal Law
In denying John Larson an opportunity to pursue a tort claim, the
court suggested that financial compensation is available to victimized
cause of action against a third party for alienation of a child's affections). Other
courts used similar reasoning in declining to adopt a tort remedy for child abduction.
See Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603, 609 (D. Vt.) (applying Ver-
mont law), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977); Bartanus v. Lis, 332 Pa. Super. 48, 55,
480 A.2d 1178, 1181 (1984).
As the dissenting justices and the court of appeals' panel in Larson correctly rec-
ognized, a cause of action for alienation of affections is very different from a cause of
action for custodial interference. "The alienation tort.., focuses on the change in
mental attitude of the spouse or child. The custody tort, by contrast, focuses on the
physical removal of a child from the custody of the parent." Larson v. Dunn, 449
N.W.2d 751, 757 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev d in part, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990). The
problems of proof and resulting opportunities for abuse that led the Minnesota Leg-
islature to abolish the "heart balm" causes of action are not present in the custodial
interference cause of action which requires only objective proof of a right to custody
of the child. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 757.
118. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 38, at 901 (noting that few topics in the
law of torts have proved to be more difficult than torts between family members).
119. See id. at 902-04.
120. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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parents under Minnesota's parental kidnapping and victim's rights
statutes.' 2' A review of the relevant provisions provides ample sup-
port for the dissent's claim that numerous gaps exist in these laws.
Under Minnesota's parental kidnapping statute, "[i]n addition to
any sentence imposed, the court may assess any expense incurred in
returning the child [to the lawful custodian] against any person con-
victed of violating the statute."' 22 However, recovery by the victim-
ized parent is limited because a conviction must first be obtained.123
Recovery for the aggrieved parent is possible under Minnesota's
victim's rights statute.' 24 The victim's rights statute is a post-charge
remedy and is part of the disposition of a criminal charge against an
offender.' 25 Financial recovery is in the form of restitution, and any
award to a crime victim rests in the discretion of the trial court.' 26
Recovery under the victim's rights statute is potentially broader than
recovery under the parental kidnapping statute because it includes
"any out of pocket losses resulting from the crime, including medical
and therapy costs, [and] replacement of wages and services ... ."127
While damages are not limited to those enumerated in the statute,
the victim's rights statute provides for recovery of restitution dam-
ages only.' 28
The typical victimized parent is in need of money to finance a
search for the child or to help force information about the child's
location from third-party participants. A tort recovery could com-
pensate the aggrieved parent for damages, such as loss of society and
emotional distress, that are not covered by Minnesota's current pa-
rental kidnapping laws.12 9
121. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990).
122. MINN. STAT. § 609.26, subd. 4 (1990). Reasonable expenses actually in-
curred to return the child are limited to "transportation costs, meals, and lodging
from the time the child was located until the child was returned home." MINN. STAT.
§ 611A.52, subd. 8 (a)(6) (1990).
123. Id. § 609.26, subd. 4.
124. Id. § 611A.04, subd. 1.
125. See id.
126. Id. § 61 1A.04, subd. 1(c). The order for restitution is docketed and enforced
as a civil judgment. Id. § 611A.04, subd. 3.
127. Id. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a).
128. See id. See also State v. O'Brien, 459 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (dis-
cussing restitution recovery under the victim's rights statute).
The Larson court did not mention damage recovery, which is possible under the
Minnesota codification of the UCCJA. The UCCJA's primary purpose, however, is to
facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees across state lines, not to compensate
the parent. Consistent with its purpose, the statute provides for the victimized par-
ent to recover travel and other necessary expenses connected with the enforcement
of the decree. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01-.25 (1990).
129. See LEGAL REMEDIES, supra note 27, at 69. ("The childsnatching tort suit
holds great promise for compensating [the parent] to the full extent of his or her
damages, perhaps more so than any other existing remedies."); CHILD SNATCHING,
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2. Tort Recovery for Lost Services of the Child
The Larson court noted that, because Minnesota already recognizes
a cause of action for lost services of a child, 1so a victimized parent
might seek relief there. However, although precedent exists for
awarding damages for lost services,l3t Minnesota has never treated
lost services as an independent tort or as a means for a parent to
recover for direct injury to the parent-child relationship. Lost serv-
ices have been employed as an item of consequential damages recov-
erable by the parent when the child has sustained direct injury caused
by the tortious conduct of a third party.13
2
For the victimized parent to recover damages through an action
for "lost services," as the court suggests, the child (or the victimized
parent on behalf of the child) would be required to establish a tort
claim against the abducting parent.1SS The court's suggestion avoids
direct compensation for the victimized parent's damages and per-
petuates the "outworn fiction" of lost services as the gravamen of the
harm where direct interference with the parent-child relationship ex-
ists.134 To require the victimized parent-to seek damages through a
tort claim on behalf of the child and to impose the additional re-
quirement of proof of lost services could unnecessarily complicate
the law and lead to unfair results.
3. Tort Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Larson court acknowledged that the tort of intentional inflic-
supra note 30, at 102 ("One major advantage of tort over a criminal remedy is that it
will come as close as possible to making the plaintiff, the custodial parent, emotion-
ally and financially whole.").
130. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990).
131. See Eichten v. Central Minn. Coop. Power Ass'n, 224 Minn. 180, 194-95, 28
N.W.2d 862, 871-72 (1947).
132. See id. at 195, 28 N.W.2d at 871.
133. See id. at 195, 28 N.W.2d at 871. Possible causes of action available to the
child include false imprisonment and IIED. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp.
15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Mother sued father on child's behalf and recovered for false
imprisonment.). Such a suit would certainly force the child to testify against family
members.
134. In the late nineteenth century, many courts completely abandoned the re-
quirement of proving lost services and instead compensated the victimized parent for
damages resulting from the direct injury to the parent-child relationship. For a dis-
cussion of early tort remedies, see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. In addi-
tion, Larson, like the majority of parental kidnapping cases, involved the abduction of
a child too young to render services to the parent. Under either a direct or conse-
quential damages theory of lost services, if a child is too young or otherwise unable
to render services, courts may resort to the fiction of "constructive" loss of services.
Resort to this legal fiction is unnecessary. The parent should be compensated for the
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tion of emotional distress could serve as a remedy for victimized par-
ents in "egregious cases."1 35 The court acknowledged that "the
conduct in this case [was] egregious, and done in defiance of a court
order," but did not allow recovery of damages under IIED.136 John
Larson presented a compelling set of facts that the court could have
used to permit him, an aggrieved parent, to recover damages for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress.
To establish a prima facie case of IED in Minnesota,13 7 conduct
must be "extreme and outrageous" and "so atrocious that it passes
the boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized
community."138 John Larson's case was certainly "intolerable."19
Less than twenty-four hours after John Larson was awarded sole cus-
135. Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Minn. 1990).
136. Id. The majority did not explain why the defendants' conduct was insuffi-
ciently egregious to allow John Larson to establish his claim for IIED at the trial
court.
137. Minnesota follows section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. For a discus-
sion of section 46 and the elements of the IIED cause of action, see supra text accom-
panying notes 57-61. See also Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428,
438-39 (Minn. 1983) (recognizing that a cause of action could exist for intentional
infliction of emotional distress without the necessity for physical impact).
138. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment d (1965)).
Allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct must meet a high threshold to
withstand a motion to dismiss the complaint or summary judgment. See, e.g., Ruzicka
v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1301 (D. Minn. 1990) (publish-
ing information from an unnamed source when the publication was not written with
the intent to breach the terms of an agreement to keep the source confidential was
not extreme and outrageous conduct); Meyer v. Tenvoorde Motor Co., 714 F. Supp.
991, 994 (D. Minn. 1989) (suddenly terminating longtime employee without warning
was not extreme and outrageous conduct by the employer); Thorkildson v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 631 F. Supp. 372, 375-76 (D. Minn. 1986) (Supervisor's criticisms and
statements about terminated female employee did not rise to the level of extreme
and outrageous conduct.); Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 650-51 (D.
Minn. 1985) (publishing the name of the city where an FBI agent and his family lived
was not extreme and outrageous conduct), aft'd, 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 757, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 1312 (1990); Leaon v. Washington
County, 397 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 1986) (Sheriff's comment that a deputy would
never work in law enforcement again was not extreme and outrageous conduct.);
Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 439-40 (Minn. 1983) (Em-
ployer's discipline and written and verbal criticism of an employee's job performance
was not outrageous conduct.); Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d
815, 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (Where an employee's job promotion was delayed,
office gossip about her was not extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the
employer.); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 908-09 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (Harassment by the employer regarding an employee's sexual preference and
alcohol problem was not extreme and outrageous conduct.). But see Venes v. Profes-
sional Serv. Bureau, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 671, 674-75 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (Where
debt collector threatened a debtor and was orally abusive, there was sufficient evi-
dence of extreme and outrageous conduct to justify jury award for IIED.).
139. The Minnesota Legislature considers parental kidnapping sufficiently intoler-
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tody ofJessica in a bitter dissolution and custody proceeding and, in
brazen defiance of a court order, Loree Rigenhagen fled the state
with the child. Loree Rigenhagen's parents, who provided financial
assistance necessary for their daughter's escape, stubbornly refused
to disclose her location, forcingJohn Larson to seek the assistance of
private investigators and the FBI. John Larson spent seven years in a
desperate search for his daughter.140 During this formative period
of Jessica's development, John Larson was completely deprived of
the opportunity to establish any relationship with his daughter.
When Jessica was finally returned to him as a nine-year-old girl, her
father was a complete stranger to her.
In Minnesota, a plaintiff asserting an IIED claim must allege severe
mental distress. "The law intervenes only where the distress in-
flicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to en-
dure it."141 This requirement "reflects a strong policy to prevent
fictitious and speculative claims."142 Accordingly, Minnesota courts
are restrictive in permitting recovery for IIED.t43
In John Larson's situation, Loree Rigenhagen's abduction of Jes-
sica in violation of a custody court order, her interstate flight, and
her seven-year concealment of her daughter are strong evidence that
severe emotional distress resulted.144 The extension of the trau-
matic event over such an extended time frame and the constant re-
able to impose felony sanctions against perpetrators. See MINN. STAT. § 609.26
(1990).
140. Cf. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 20-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Mother recov-
ered damages for IIED when she was separated from her child for three months dur-
ing which time the child was taken to Yugoslavia in violation of habeas corpus and
civil contempt orders.); Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 475-76, 392 A.2d 431, 433
(1978) (Mother alleged sufficiently outrageous facts to recover damages for IIED
when separated from her child for one month.).
141. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment j (1965)).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Center, 448 N.W.2d 78 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989). In Stubbs, a physician performed cosmetic surgery on a patient and then
published unauthorized before and after pictures. Although the court did not reach
the issue of whether the doctor's conduct was extreme and outrageous, the court
held that the plaintiff's allegations of loss of sleep, sore throats, cold sores and head-
aches did not meet the Hubbard threshold requirement for severe emotional distress.
See id. at 81. See also Venes v. Professional Serv. Bureau, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 671, 675
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (The aggravation of the plaintiff's existing medical problems,
including migraines, ulcers, and spastic bowel syndrome, was sufficient evidence of
severe emotional distress to sustain a jury verdict for IIED recovery.); Eklund v. Vin-
cent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 378-79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (Plain-
tiff's injuries, including humiliation, embarrassment, insomnia, nervousness,
depression, financial fears and lack of self-confidence, did not meet the threshold
requirement of severity of emotional distress.).
144. See supra note 61 (discussing severe emotional distress).
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minder provided by John Larson's continued search for his daughter
strongly indicates that his emotional suffering was not contrived.145
Minnesota's extremely high threshold for allegations of emotional
distress makes it difficult for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss
unless severe physical manifestations of mental suffering exist. As
Minnesota courts currently apply the cause of action, IIED is virtu-
ally useless as a remedy for victimized parents whose emotional dis-
tress, although severe and genuine, provides insufficient tangible
proof to withstand a motion to dismiss. Consequently, most victim-
ized parents are left without a tort cause of action to recover dam-
ages for emotional distress.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Larson court's hands-off approach to damage recovery in pa-
rental kidnapping cases leaves victimized parents in Minnesota with-
out an adequate remedy to redress their injuries. This approach
places the financial and emotional burdens created by the abducting
parent on the parent whose legal right to custody has been intention-
ally violated.
In the wake of Larson, the Minnesota Legislature should remedy
these inequities by enacting a statutory remedy for intentional inter-
ference with custodial rights.146 Recognition of a tort of custodial
interference can be solidly grounded in Minnesota policy. The state
constitution guarantees a remedy for wrongs to "person, property or
character" for all persons in the state.' 47 In addition, Minnesota's
parental kidnapping148 and victim's rights149 statutes, as well as the
Minnesota Supreme Court's recognition of other torts for direct in-
jury to intangible interests,150 provide strong policy basis for a tort
remedy for intentional interference with custodial rights.
The following proposed legislation (Proposed Act) creates a com-
145. Cf. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 20-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Sheltra v.
Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 475, 392 A.2d 431, 433 (1978).
146. During the 1991 Session, companion bills were introduced in the Minnesota
House of Representatives and Senate that were similar in form and substance to the
one proposed here. H.F. 1297, 80th Leg.; S.F. 1024, 80th Leg. At the close of the
legislative session, both bills remained in the Judiciary Committees of the House and
Senate.
147. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
148. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota's paren-
tal kidnapping statute).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28 (discussing Minnesota's victim's
rights statute).
150. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437-38 (Minn.
1983) (recognizing tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of an
"invasion of a legal right likely to provoke a severe emotional disturbance").
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prehensive tort remedy for victimized parents.151 By focusing on the
objective criteria of the plaintiff-parent's legal right to custody of the
child, the statute avoids the volatile issue of custodial fitness. In ad-
dition, the Proposed Act includes mechanisms designed to en-
courage settlement of suits and curb abuses of the remedy.
A. Proposed Act for Interference with a Possessory Interest in a Child
Sec. 1. Definitions
(a) "Court order" includes provisions in a decree or judg-
ment and temporary and permanent orders of the courts of this
and other states and nations.152
(b) "Possessory interest in a child" means a right of posses-
sion of or access to a child and includes custody and visitation
rights. 153
Sec. 2. Liability for Interference with Child Custody
(a) A person who takes or retains possession of a child or who
conceals the whereabouts of a child in violation of a court order
that provides for possessory interests in a child may be liable for
damages to the person who is denied a possessory interest in the
child. 154
(b) The taking or retention of possession of a child or the
child's concealment is a violation of a court order if it occurs at
any time during which a person other than the person commit-
ting the act is entitled under the court order to a possessory in-
terest in a child.
151. The proposed statute is modeled after one adopted by the state of Texas in
1983. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.01-.08 (1985). The Texas statute is the most
comprehensive custodial interference statute in the nation. Dean Sheila Reynolds of
the Washburn University School of Law also used the Texas statute as the basis for
her proposed model act to expand tort remedies for custodial interference. See Reyn-
olds, supra note 2, at 261-63. Eight other states have created a statutory cause of
action for custodial interference. See supra note 53.
152. Temporary custodial orders are covered by the Texas custodial interference
statute. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 36.01 (1985). By including temporary orders
within the scope of coverage, greater protection is provided to victimized parents.
153. This section expands the scope of recovery beyond that provided by section
700 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and by most states. Section 700 requires the
parent to establish a superior right to custody of the child. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 700 (1977). The Restatement approach forecloses a tort remedy in paren-
tal kidnapping situations when the parents have joint custody or when a non-custo-
dial parent has court-ordered visitation rights. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 246-47.
154. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 258-59. In her proposed act, Dean Reynolds
added a section, patterned on the cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, to provide for recovery in pre-custody situations. Id. at 261. This
author has chosen to adhere to the Texas approach which bases the grounds for
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(c) Each person who aids or assists in conduct for which a
cause of action is authorized by subsection (a) of this section is
jointly and severally liable for damages.
(d) A person who was not a party to the suit in which a court
order was issued providing for possessory interests in a child is
not liable under this chapter for a violation of the court order
unless the person at the time of the violation:
(1) had actual notice of the existence and contents of the or-
der; or
(2) had reasonable cause to believe that the child was the sub-
ject of a court order and that his actions were likely to violate the
order; or
(3) had reasonable cause to believe that the child was about to
suffer immediate harm or that the child would be subjected to
immediate harm if it returned home, and the person acted for
the purpose of saving the child from the threatening danger or
of assisting the child to escape from such danger.
Sec. 3. Damages
(a) Damages under this chapter may include:
(1) the actual costs and expenses of the petitioner in locating
the child;
(2) the actual costs and expenses of the petitioner in recover-
ing possession of the child, if the petitioner is entitled to posses-
sion of the child;
(3) the actual costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, of
the petitioner in enforcing the court order that was violated;
(4) the actual costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, of
bringing the suit under this chapter; and
(5) the value of mental suffering and anguish incurred by the
petitioner because of a violation of the court order.
(b) If liability arises under section 2 of this chapter and the
person liable acted with malice or an intent to cause harm to the
person who is denied a possessory interest in the child, the court
or jury may award punitive damages.
Sec. 4. Affirmative Defenses
Affirmative defenses under this chapter include:
(a) that the person violated the order with the express con-
sent of the petitioner; and
(b) that after receiving notice of violation under this section,
the person promptly and fully complied with the order.
Sec. 5. Immunity
Spousal immunity shall not apply to actions brought pursuant
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to this chapter. 155
Sec. 6. Venue
A suit under this chapter may be brought in any county where
the petitioner or the respondent resides or in which a suit affect-
ing the parent-child relationship concerning the child who is the
subject of the court order may be brought.
Sec. 7. Remedies Not Affected
This chapter does not affect any other civil or criminal remedy
available to any person, including the child, for interference with
child custody nor does it affect the power of a parent to repre-
sent the interest of a child in any suit brought on behalf of the
child. 156
Sec. 8. Notice
(a) As a prerequisite to the filing of suit under this chapter, a
person who has been denied a possessory interest in a child in
violation of a court order shall give written notice of the specific
violation of the order to the person violating the order.
(b) The notice shall be by certified or registered mail, return
receipt requested, to the last known address of the person al-
leged to be in violation of the order.
(c) The notice shall include a statement of the intention of the
sender to file suit no less than thirty days after the date of the
mailing unless the order is promptly and fully complied with.
(d) Notice need not be given to persons aiding or assisting in
155. Many states, including Minnesota, have abolished both spousal and parental
immunity. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (abolishing
the doctrine of parental immunity); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 373, 173
N.W.2d 416, 420 (1969) (abolishing the doctrine of interspousal immunity). How-
ever, in states that have retained the doctrine of spousal immunity, spousal immunity
may bar an action for custodial interference when parental kidnapping occurs before
the issuance of the divorce decree. Similarly, the doctrine of parental immunity may
bar a suit brought by or on behalf of the child.
Even states which have barred the two immunity doctrines have shown some
reluctance to completely abrogate their effect with regard to some intentional torts
committed between family members. For example, although Beaudette abolished in-
terspousal immunity in negligence actions, the status of the doctrine with regard to
intentional torts between husband and wife is still unclear. Beaudette declared that
one spouse may not recover damages from the other "without substantial evidence
that the injurious contact was plainly excessive or a gross abuse of the normal privi-
lege." Beaudette, 285 Minn. at 373, 173 N.W.2d at 420.
156. This provision would permit suits by victimized parents for pre-custodial ab-
duction when the facts support a cause of action for IIED. The victimized child could
also recover damages from the abducting parent in certain circumstances. One pos-
sible cause of action for an abducted child is lIED. Another is false imprisonment.
See Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Child recovered damages
against abducting parent for false imprisonment.).
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conduct for which a cause of action is authorized under this
chapter.
(e) Evidence that notice has been given under this subsection
may be introduced in any proceeding under this chapter.
Sec. 9. Frivolous Suits
A person sued for damages under this section is entitled to
recover attorney's fees and costs if:
(a) the claim for damages is dismissed or judgment is
awarded to the defendant; and
(b) the court or jury finds that the claim for damages is frivo-
lous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
B. Comments Regarding the Proposed Act
The Proposed Act could be a powerful addition to the criminal
and civil sanctions currently available to victimized parents in Minne-
sota. The Proposed Act provides the flexibility necessary to tailor a
remedy to the plaintiff-parent's particular needs and expands the
scope of potential defendants to permit complete recovery of dam-
ages frequently suffered by victimized parents. At the same time, the
Proposed Act expressly encourages the use of existing tort remedies
to fill gaps and offer damage recovery in particularly wrongful situa-
tions not covered under the Proposed Act.
After enactment of the Proposed Act, the use of criminal sanc-
tions, judicial contempt, or the writ of habeas corpus would remain
as the victimized parent's first step to secure the speedy return of the
child.I57 These remedies would also serve as the primary means of
deterring parental abductions. However, when such approaches fail
to work, the statute would provide economic leverage to the victim-
ized parent.
The Proposed Act is designed to minimize the adverse effects on
the abducted child. Recovery is barred in the absence of a court or-
der granting the plaintiff-parent custody or visitation rights. When
such an order exists, the plaintiff must prove only a knowing interfer-
ence by the defendant. Since no other proof of the defendant's in-
tent or actions is required, the plaintiff-parent would not need to join
the victimized child as a party or obtain the child's testimony to re-
cover damages.
When third parties actively aid or assist the abductor, they may be
held jointly and severally liable to the victimized parent for dam-
ages.158 Possible third-party defendants include family members or
157. See generally supra text accompanying notes 33-37 (discussing judicial con-
tempt and the writ of habeas corpus).
158. See generally supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing recovery
against third parties). See also MINN. STAT. § 609.05, subd. 1 (1990) ("A person is
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friends who assist in the abduction. However, liability does not at-
tach unless the third party acts with actual knowledge of the custody
order or has reasonable cause to believe that the child is the subject
of a court order that the party's actions are likely to violate. A sepa-
rate defense is available when the third party acts in the reasonable
belief that he is saving the child from the threat of immediate danger
or harm. 159
The possibility of a flood of litigation is controlled by notice re-
quirements and provisions awarding costs and attorney fees for suits
deemed frivolous.160 These provisions should help reduce the
number of lawsuits brought solely as a means of harassment or re-
venge. In addition, the dispute may be resolved without resort to
trial when the abducting parent's compliance with the court order is
an affirmative defense.
The Proposed Act provides a single, comprehensive remedy for
the victims of parental kidnapping. Recoverable damages include
the costs and expenses incurred in locating and recovering posses-
sion of the child and in enforcing the violated court order. The value
of mental suffering incurred by the victimized parent is also compen-
sable.161 Punitive damages could be recovered in situations where
the defendant acted with malice or with an intent to cause harm to
the plaintiff. Thus, the Proposed Act compensates the aggrieved
parent more completely than IED or any other remedy currently
available in Minnesota.
CONCLUSION
After Larson v. Dunn, victimized parents in Minnesota are signifi-
cantly less protected than their counterparts in other states. The
Larson court confidently asserted that Minnesota's existing parental
kidnapping laws offer sufficient redress to victimized parents and
children. However, judicial sanctions do not offer financial compen-
sation, and Minnesota's statutory remedies provide only restitution-
ary recovery. Judicial and statutory remedies provide aggrieved
parents and children with only piecemeal compensation.
criminally liable for a crime by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires,
counsels or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.").
159. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 comment e (1977). See also MINN.
STAT. § 609.26, subd. 2 (1990) (setting forth affirmative defenses to the charge of
depriving another of custodial or parental rights).
160. Cf. MINN. R. Civ. P. 11 (1991) (permitting recovery of reasonable expenses,
including attorneys' fees, when a pleading is interposed for purposes of harassment
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation).
161. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 comment g (1977). See also supra




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss4/6
1991] CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE 1189
To remedy this situation, the Minnesota Legislature should enact a
statutory tort remedy for custodial interference. A law such as the
one proposed here would wholly compensate the aggrieved parent
and help deter future parental abductions. Such a law would ad-
vance important social objectives without placing an undue burden
on abducted children or the judicial system.
Although John Larson cannot regain the precious seven years he
lost when his daughter was snatched from his custody, other parents
can be spared such a fate. Recognition of a custodial interference
tort is in the public interest of the state of Minnesota.
Sharon McDonnell Dobbs
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